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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction from final agency action in formal
proceedings of the Labor Commission under the Administrative Procedures Act and Chapter 2a
of the Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46-b-16(l) & (2) (2004); 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Labor Commission correctly applied Section
34A-3-106(2) of the Utah Code requiring that mental stress arising predominantly from
employment, in light of the undisputed finding of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter
"ALJ") that Respondent Nancy Wood's (hereinafter "Wood") mental stress condition was fifty
percent employment related and fifty percent non-employment related.
The standard of review for the Labor Commission's interpretation/application of a statute
is correction-of-error. Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12 \ 9, 84 P.3d 1201;
Wood v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 490 f 5, 128 P.3d 41, 43.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
The "Mental Stress as an Occupational Disease" provision is set forth verbatim in the
Addendum to this brief. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106 (2005).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case.

This is a Petition for Review of the Order on Remand from Utah Court of Appeals of the
Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission dated March 31, 2006. (R. 158-163) insomuch as
it confirms the Preliminary Determination of Pemianent Total Disability and Order of the ALJ
dated July 30, 2003, (R.65-78) and denies the Motion for Review of Petitioners' herein dated
August 29, 2003 (R.83-94).

1

b.

Course of Proceedings.

On February 26, 2001, Wood filed an Occupational Disease Claim of Employee alleging
that she sustained an occupational disease that directly caused permanent total disability arising
from mental stress occurring at work. (R.1). Although Petitioners (hereinafter, collectively,
"WCF") did not dispute that Wood's medical condition was such that she was permanently and
totally disabled, WCF contended that Wood's mental stress was not legally or medically caused
by Wood's work exposures and, if so, WCF was entitled to apportionment against all nonemployment causes of her condition. (R.4-5). On December 21, 2001, Wood amended her
occupational disease claim to allege that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was also liable for
her occupational disease. (R. 11-12).
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund moved to dismiss (R.26-30). Without a ruling on the
Motion to Dismiss, the matter proceeded to hearing on March 6, 2002. (R.149 [hereinafter
specific pages in the transcript of hearing shall be referred to as "Tr."]).
On August 20, 2002, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim
Order which, inter alia, dismissed the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, determined that Wood met
the legal causation standard of Section 34A-3-106(2) and, having found that there was a dispute
in the medical evidence, referred the issue of medical causation and/or apportionment to a
medical panel for determination. (R.40-51).
On January 21, 2003, the medical panel issued its report, dated November 12, 2002. The
medical panel opined that Wood's work activities did cause mental stress resulting in her
medical condition, which, in turn, caused her permanent total disability, but that nonemployment stressors such as personality type which predisposed her to stress, chronic
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headaches and low back pain also contributed to her condition and found that "50% of her
current mental condition is attributable to the occupational exposure." (R.56-64).
On July 30, 2003, the ALJ entered a Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total
Disability and Order which determined, inter alia, that Wood's disability was legally and
medically caused by exposures at work. There being no objection to the medical panel report,
the ALJ admitted the medical panel report into evidence, including the medical panel's
conclusion that fifty percent of Wood's mental stress condition was related to industrial causes
and fifty percent to non-industrial causes. (R.65-82).
On August 29, 2003, WCF filed a Motion for Review before the Appeals Board of the
Labor Commission which contended that the Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total
Disability and Order should be reversed because Wood failed to show that her mental stress was
legally caused by employment in that it arose predominantly from employment and that such
mental stress was "extraordinary" under Section 34A-3-106 of the Utah Code. (R.83-94).
On October 18, 2004, the Labor Commission Appeals Board entered an Order Granting
Motion for Review on the grounds that Wood had failed to show that her mental stress was
extraordinary. The Appeals Board did not consider the issue as to whether the mental stress
arose predominantly from employment. (R. 138-144).
Wood timely filed a Petition for Review before this court contending that the Labor
Commission Appeals Board did not correctly apply the "extraordinary" requirement of Section
34A-3-106(2) to establish legal causation. On November 10, 2004, this court vacated the Appeal
Board's Order Granting Motion for Review and remanded the case to the Appeals Board to
apply its construction that the "extraordinary" nature of the alleged mental stress should be
judged in accordance with "stress that people nationwide generally endure in their employment
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and non-employment life rather than stress sustained by those in [Wood's] profession." (R.150157); Wood v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 490, 128 P.3d 41 (hereinafter "Wood 7")c.

Disposition at Agency.

On March 31, 2006, the Labor Commission Appeals Board issued an Order on Remand
from Utah Court of Appeals and applied the aforesaid standard to reverse its earlier decision
granting WCF's Motion for Review and instead denied the Motion for Review, and affirmed the
award of benefits to Wood contained in the Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total
Disability and Order dated July 30, 2003. (R.158-63).
d.

Statement of Facts.

WCF does not dispute the Statement of Facts by this court in its opinion filed on
November 10, 2005 to the extent that they are relevant to this appeal.1 In addition, WCF sets
forth the following relevant facts:
At the hearing, Wood admitted that there were other non-occupational stressors in her
life. For example, Wood's married son and children lived with her until December, 2001 and
Wood was called on to babysit the children (Tr. 66-67); Wood's husband had an accident in
1997 that resulted in his disability, for which he is receiving social security benefits, but not
worker's compensation benefits (Tr. 68-73); Wood suffered from a viral condition in her spine
that caused her a great deal of stress and resulted in her being confined to a hospital for six days
in 1999 (Tr. 75); and Wood suffered from headaches that began in 1995 and continued through
March, 2000 and thereafter (Tr. 75-77).

1

Of course, since WCF does not dispute the Labor Commission's ultimate finding that Wood's mental stress was
extraordinary within the guidelines set by this court in Wood I, most of the facts stated by this court in Wood I are
not relevant to this appeal.

4

The medical panel acknowledged some of the aforesaid stressors and added some of its
own, such as a personality type that predisposed Wood to mental stress; hospitalization for a
hysterectomy in 1986; vague complaints of fatigue in August, 1989; lumbar radiculopathy as a
result of an injury in February, 1995 with continuing back problems and numbness and pain that
was to the extent that surgery was considered. (R.60).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the Labor Commission, without objection from either party, adopted the medical
panel report, which found that fifty percent of Wood's medical condition was caused by
occupational exposures and fifty percent by non-occupational exposures, under a plain reading of
Section 34A-3-106(2)(l) of the Utah Code, the mental stress that resulted in such condition was
not predominantly caused by employment.

Therefore, despite the finding of the Labor

Commission Appeals Board that the mental stress was "extraordinary", Wood's claim still fails
to meet the standard of legal causation and the award of benefits was improper.
ARGUMENT
I.
WOOD'S MEDICAL CONDITION AS A RESULT OF MENTAL
STRESS DID NOT ARISE PREDOMINANTLY FROM
EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
SECTION 34A-3-106 OF THE UTAH CODE
Section 34A-3-106 of the Utah Code establishes the means whereby an injured
worker can obtain worker's compensation benefits for an occupational disease arising from
mental stress: "Physical, mental or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out of and
in the course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only when there is a

sufficient

legal and medical causal connection between the employee's disease and

employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-106(l) (2005).2
Subsection (3) of Section 34A-3-106 requires that a claimant show that his medical
condition was "medically caused by the mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical,
mental, or emotional disease." Id, Subsection (3). Although WCF contended that the medical
evidence failed to show that Wood's medical condition was caused by mental stress arising from
work, WCF did not dispute the opinions of the medical panel or the ultimate determination of the
ALJ as to the issue of medical causation, providing, however, that legal causation was
established.
In order to show legal causation, a claimant must prove "extraordinary mental stress from
arising predominantly and directly from employment." Id., Subsection (2) (emphasis added).
Thus, WCF argued in the Motion for Review filed on August 29, 2003, that Wood's mental
stress was not extraordinary as defined under Subsection (2)(b) and, based upon the medical
panel's split of 50/50 that the mental stress was predominant. (R.84-92).
In its Order Granting Motion for Review, dated October 18, 2004, the Appeals Board of
the Labor Commission addressed only the question of whether Wood's mental stress was
"extraordinary" and never reached the question of whether such mental stress arose
"predominantly" from Wood's employment. Thus, when Wood I was decided, this court
likewise only addressed the appropriate standard for "extraordinary" and not whether the mental
stress arose "predominately" from Wood's employment.3 WCF does not now claim that the

2

Section 34A-3-106 has not been amended since it was original enacted in 1995. Id., Legislative History.
Although it was not briefed, at the time of the oral argument resulting in Wood I, WCF argued that this court could
still affirm the Labor Commission on the "predominant" question that it did not reach, based upon the doctrine
established in Bailey v. Bayles, 2000 UT 58, ^ 10, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 and hie v. Hickman, 2004 UT App 469, U 8,
n.3, 105 P.3d 946, 948, n.3. Apparently, because the matter had not been briefed, this court did not follow WCF's
suggestion.
3

6

Labor Commission Appeals Board improperly applied the standard set forth in Wood I. Instead,
WCF now contends that despite such finding, Wood never met her burden of showing that her
mental stress arose predominantly from her employment. Stated another way, Wood had to
show that her employment related stress was the predominant cause of the mental health
condition claimed as the occupational disease that resulted in her disability.
In Wood I itself, this court determined that "the Commission and Appeals Board are not
granted any discretion to interpret or apply the terms of Utah Code section 34A-3-106(1) & (2)
... ." 2005 UT App 490 f 7, 128 P.3d at 44. In its interpretation of the statute, this court must
first look to the plain language of the statute. In re General Determination of Rights to the Use
of Water, 2004 UT 106 % 18, 110 P.3d 666, 671.
Here, the key term is "predominantly." Since "predominantly" is not a legal term of art,4
a resort to the dictionary is appropriate. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language defines "predominant", from which the adverb "predominately" derives, as follows:
"(1) Having greatest ascendency, importance, influence, authority or force. (2) Most common
or conspicuous; main or prevalent."

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,

1383 (4th Ed. 2000). The New Oxford American Dictionary defines "predominant" as, " (1)
present as the strongest or main element; (2) having or exerting control or power." The New
Oxford American Dictionaiy,

1343 (2001).

Accordingly, by the plain definition of

"predominant", Wood's employment mental stress must have been the strongest and most
influential causal element of the mental condition for which she claims benefits as an
occupational disease.

Indeed, there is no definition of the word "predominant" m Black's Law Dictionary. Black's Law Dictionary? (71
Ed. 2000).
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The intent of the legislature in codifying the heightened standard for legal causation by
the use of the term "arising predominantly and directly from employment" was to limit the
compensability of this type of occupational disease claim. Thus, the plain reading of the statute
is consistent with legislative intent.
Since the medical panel determined that only fifty percent of Wood's medical condition,
which was medically caused by her mental stress, was employment related, the ALJ improperly
found that Wood's mental stress arose "predominantly" from employment.

Therefore, the

Appeals Board should have reversed the ALJ either in its initial Order granting Motion for
Review or in its Order on Remand from the Court of Appeals. Since it did not, this court should
reverse the decision of the Appeals Board of the Labor Commission.
Ms. Wood will likely argue that the 50/50 apportionment of her medical condition for
purposes of medical causation is not the same as an apportionment for purposes of legal
causation. Indeed, Wood has previously cited Schwinn v. Labor Commission, 1999 UT App 26
(unpublished opinion) for the proposition that the focus of Section 34A-3-106(2) is upon the
stimuli, rather than upon the medical cause of claimant's condition.

Even assuming that

Schwinn, as an unpublished opinion, is applicable here, that is exactly what the medical panel did
in this case; it focused on all of the mental stress stimuli that could conceivably have caused
Wood's medical condition.
Although, arguably, the ALJ was not required to resort to the opinion of the medical
panel to detemiine whether the mental stress arising from work was predominant, the ALJ did
not make any such analysis and simply adopted the opinions of the medical panel.5 Accordingly,

5

Wood herself acknowledged that the ALJ did not make any independent analysis of whether the stimuli was
predominant and even suggested a remand to the ALJ for such a determination. Applicant's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Review, dated October 3, 2003 (R.135).
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the only factual finding regarding the extent of work-related stressors was the 50/50 finding of
the medical panel, which was adopted by the ALJ.
II.
OTHER STATES WHOSE STATUTES REQUIRE A SHOWING
OF PREDOMINANT EMPLOYMENT STRESSORS HAVE
INTERPRETED SUCH STATUTES TO REQUIRE A SHOWING
OF GREATER THAN FIFTY PERCENT OF SUCH STRESSORS
Although the issue of "predominantly" is one of first impression in this state, fortunately,
several other states have adopted similar statutes which they have interpreted in their appellate
decisions. Section 3208.3 of the California Labor Code provides that in order for a psychiatric
injury to be compensable, the events of employment must be "predominant as to all causes
combined in the psychiatric injury." Cal. Labor Code § 3208.3(b)(1). (Deering 2006). The
California Court of Appeal in two separate cases has held that more than half of the mental stress
must be attributable to employment. Lockheed Martin v. Workers .Compensation Appeals Board,
96 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 67 Cal. Comp. Cases 245, 253, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865 (2002); Department
of Corrections v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 76 Cal. App. 4 n 810, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d
716(1999).
Chapter 152, Section 1 of the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts provides that although
mental and emotional disabilities may be compensable, they are compensable "only where the
predominant contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occurring with
any employment." Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 152, § 1(7A) (Matthew Bender, 2006). In May v. MCI
Framingham, 2005 MA. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 41, the reviewing board of the Department of
Industrial Accidents of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts held that the aforesaid provision
"means the work cause(s) must be greater than the sum of all non-work-relatecl causes." Id. at 7
(emphasis in original) (the board noted that even though a physician had opined that the work
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environment was the major cause of the claimant's mental injury, it was not the predominant
cause because "major cause could be greater than any other cause, but not greater than the sum
of all other causes").6
The Alaska statutes provide that in order for a mental injury caused by mental stress to be
compensable, the claimant must show that "the work stress was the predominant cause of the
mental injury." Alaska Stat. § 23.30.010(b)(2) (Matthew Bender 2006). In Williams v. State,
938 P.2d 1065, 1071 (Alaska 1997), the Supreme Court of Alaska interpreted Section
23.30.010(b)(2) to mean that the claimant did not have the presumption of compensability as
with a physical injury claim but had the burden of proof of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the mental stress was predominant.
Finally, the State of Maine has statutorily provided that for a mental injury caused by
mental stress to be compensable, "the work stress, and not some other source of stress, [must be]
the predominant cause of the mental injury." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 39-A, § 201(3)(B) (2005).
There are no appellate decisions from Maine that directly interpret the aforesaid statute;
however, in Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, 404 A. 2d 1014, 1020 (Me. 1979), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, before the adoption of the aforesaid provision, held that in
order to recover for mental injury from ordinary stressors at work, a claimant must show by clear
and convincing evidence "that the ordinary and usual work-related pressures dominated in
producing the injury." So, Maine, like Utah, has required that in mental stress claims, a claimant
must show something more than the typical showing in a physical injury claim.7

6

A copy of May is included in the Addendum to this brief.
Of course, in Utah the standard of proof is still "preponderance, but Section 34A-3-106 requires a showing of
"predominant" and "extraordinary" that are not usually required for physical injury claims.
7

10

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse the decision of the Labor
Commission Appeals Board and remand the case to the Labor Commission for entry of an
Order dismissing Wood's occupational disease claim for mental stress, with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted this

day of rruittff'

tJjfP-

Attorney for Petitioners
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, 2006.
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Text of Section 34A-3-106

A

§ 34A-3-106. Mental stress claims

(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental stress arising out of
and in the course of employment shall be compensable under this chapter only when
there is a sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the employee's
disease and employment.
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising
predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is j u d g e d according to an
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and
nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental, or emotional disease
was medically caused by the mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical,
mental, or emotional disease.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary actions, work
evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or
retirements, may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor practices otherwise actionable
at law may not form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational disease involving mental
stress bears the burden of proof to establish legal and medical causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 3 5 - 2 - 1 0 4 . 1 , enacted by L 1995, ch. 309, § 2 ; renumbered by
L 1996, ch. 240, § 196; renumbered by L 1997, ch. 375, § 154.

May v. MCI, Framingham
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LEXSEE 2005 MA WRK. COMP. LEXIS 41
ROBIN MAY, EMPLOYEE; MCI FRAMINGHAM, EMPLOYER;
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, SELF-INSURER
BOARD NUMBER 030458-02
REVIEWING BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS OF
MASSACHUSETTS
2005 MA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 41
July 8, 2005
COUNSEL:
APPEARANCES: Teresa Brooks Benoit, Esq., for the employee
Patricia G. Noone, Esq., for the self-insurer
JUDGES: REVIEWING BOARD: Judges Horan, Costigan and McCarthy
OPINION:
[*1]
HORAN, J.
The employee appeals from a decision denying her claim for a work-related emotional injury. Because the medical
evidence does not satisfy the employee's burden of proof under G. L. c. 152, § 1(7 A), nl we affirm the decision.

nl General Laws c. 152, § 1(7A), provides, in relevant part:

Personal injuries shall include mental or emotional disabilities only where the predominant
contributing cause of such disability is an event or series of events occurring within any
employment.

The employee, a corrections officer, claimed her injury and incapacity resulted from incidents of harassment at
work. n2 (Dec. 2.) At hearing, the only medical evidence before the judge was the report and deposition of the § 11A
impartial psychiatrist, Dr. Zamir Nestlebaum. n3 (Dec. 1.) Dr. Nestlebaum opined the employee suffered from a major
depressive episode, [*2] which disabled her from work. He accepted the employee's history of work-related harassment,
and opined the hostile work environment "was the major factor in the direct causality of her depressive episode."
(Statutory Ex. 1 at 6.) At his deposition, the doctor also described the work incidents as "the primary cause" of the
employee's depression. (Dep. 20.) However, Dr. Nestlebaum found other important stressors contributed to the
employee's depressive episode: her mother's Alzheimer's disease and death, the building of a house, and the apparent
reliving of her father's experience at being hounded out of jobs through no fault of his own. (Dec. 4; Statutory Ex. 1;
Dep. 11-12, 14-15.)

n2 The specific allegations are impertinent to our disposition of the appeal.
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n3 The employee made no attempt to introduce additional medical evidence at hearing, nor did the judge act, sua
sponte, to require such evidence. See G. L. c. 152, § 11 A(2). The judge was not required to do so. Viveiros's
Case, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 296 (2001).
[*3]
The judge concluded the employee had failed to meet the requisite burden of proving the work events were "the
predominant contributing cause" of her emotional disability. "While Dr. Nestlebaum suggests that [the] hostile work
environment is a major cause of the emotional disability, he also identifies at least three other factors adding to the level
of stress." n4 (Dec. 5.) The judge therefore denied the employee's claim. (Dec. 6.)

n4 Given the analysis that follows, we place no stock in the judge's erroneous reference to the doctor's causation
opinion as "a major," rather than "the major," which the doctor clearly stated in his report. (Statutory Ex. 1.) We
use the actual opinion of Dr. Nestlebaum for our analysis.
The employee raises two issues; we address only one. n5 The employee argues the judge erred by disregarding the
prima facie weight afforded to Dr. Nestlebauni's opinion as a § 11A psychiatrist. (Employee br. 1.) [*4] The judge did
not disregard or mischaracterize Dr. Nestlebauni's opinion, nor did he impermissibly substitute his own lay opinion for
it. The judge simply found, inter alia, n6 the doctor's opinion failed to qualify the employee's emotional injury as
compensable under c. 152, as the doctor never characterized the work events as "the predominant contributing cause" of
the disability. G. L. c. 152, § 1(7A). At the deposition, employee's counsel did not ask the doctor whether the
employment events were the predominant contributing cause of her client's emotional disability. n7 On appeal, the
employee argues the doctor's causation opinion, which utilized the words "major" and "primary," was, as a matter of
law, the expression of an opinion legally synonymous with "the predominant contributing cause" standard. We disagree.

n5 The employee's second stated issue asks us to determine "whether the Employee's hostile work environment
was the major and predominant cause of her disability." We are not empowered to make findings of fact; we
only review findings under applicable law. See G. L. c. 152, § 11C.
[*5]

n6 The judge found the employee's departure from the workplace, several years after the alleged harassment at
work, was occasioned by a job transfer which he found was "a bona fide personnel action." (Dec. 6.) The
employee does not challenge this finding on appeal.

n7 See Bourassa v. D.J. Reardon Co., 10 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 213, 218 at n.4. (1996)("at any deposition
of the § 11A examiner, the attorneys must gear their questions to the applicable definition of personal injury.")
The judge found and reasoned as follows:
Even if the employee's testimony is accepted in full, as it was by the impartial physician, this would
be a case where the employee would fall just short of the standard. While Dr. Nestlebaum suggests that
[the] hostile work environment is a major cause of the emotional disability, he [*6] also identifies at
least three other factors adding to the level of stress. They include the building of a house, the
deterioration and death of the employee's mother, and the identification of the employee's situation with
similar situations that had apparently arisen in her father's life.
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2005MAWrk Comp LEXIS 41,
As outlined
in Siano
16 Mass Workeis' Comp Rep 237, (2002), while it is possible that
theie can be multiple ' majoi" causes of medical disability, theie can be by definition but one
"piedommant" cause

(Dec 5 )
It was not enoi foi the judge to deny and dismiss the claim on this lecoid "Major" does not necessanly mean "the
piedommant" The majoi cause could be gieatei than any othei cause, but not gieatei than the sum of all othei causes A
synonym foi "piedommance" is "piepondeiance " The Amencan Rentage Dictionaiy, Second College Edition, pp 976,
978 (1985) As we undeistand m legal piactice, the "piepondeiance of the evidence" designates an amount that
constitutes moie than half, "evidence which is of gieatei weight
than the evidence which is offeied m opposition to
it" Black's Law Dictionaiy, Sixth Edition, p 1182 (1990) Piepondeiance ["7] "denotes a supenonty of weight" Id
We conclude that undei the § 1 (7A) standaid foi emotional woik injuiies, "the piedommant contiibutmg cause" means
the woik cause(s) must be gi eatei than the sum of all non-woi A-/ elated causes n8

n8 Piactitioneis and junsts alike aie advised not to confuse our rationale heie with the discussion of the standaid
ofpwofnecessaiy m an "as is" causation case See Valachovic v Big Y Foods, 19 Mass Woikers' Comp
Rep
(May 26, 2005)(a doctor's opinion that there is only a fifty peicent chance the woik contnbuted at all to
the incapacity is legally insufficient pioof of causation in an "as is" case) In this case, it is acknowledged the
employee's woik was one of seveial causes of hei emotional injury Oui focus heie is on the highei standaid of
causation lequired in an emotional injury claim wheie many causes, including the employment, contribute to
cause the injury
[*8]
We therefoie reject the employee's aigument that medical testimony establishing the work incidents as "the majoi"
or "the pumaiy" satisfied, as a matter of law, the "piedommant contiibutmg cause" standard for emotional injuiies,
where, as heie, the employment was only one of seveial acknowledged contiibutmg causes We have interpreted
"majoi," in the context of the fomth sentence of § 1(7A) addiessmg "combination" injuiies, as meaning "significant "
"By definition theie can be but one "piedommant" cause and it is the single most important, influential oi foiceful cause
of medical disability Theie may, however, be multiple majoi' causes A majoi cause is an nnpoitant a senous, a
modei ately significant cause " Siano v Specialty Sciew & Bolt, Inc , 16 Mass Woikeis' Comp Rep 237, 240
(2002)(emphasis added) See also Myeis v M B T A , 19 Mass Woikeis' Comp Rep
(Januaiy 28, 2005)("the
significant" cause easily satisfies "a majoi cause" standaid undei § 1(7A)) "Pumaiy" means "fust in a list, senes oi
sequence " The American Hentage Dictionary, supia at 983 Because we have held the words "primary" n9 and
"significant" [*9] nlO aie synonymous with "majoi" undei the fourth sentence of § 1(7A), nl 1 equating those terms
with "piedommant" would, in effect, negate the last statutoiy amendment to the thud sentence, and piovide no
meaningful distinction between the statute's diveigent causation schemes We theiefoie conclude, on the facts found, the
judge was not lequned to mterpiet the doctoi's use of the woid "pumaiy" as meaning "piedommant"

n9 Wall v Lepages, Inc , 11 Mass Woikei's Comp Rep 359 (1997)

nlO Siano, supia at 240

nl 1 The fourth sentence of the statute concerns itself with "combination" injuiies, "majoi but not necessanly
piedommant" causation, and is not limited to mental oi emotional disabilities Heie, we addiess the standaid
contained m the thud sentence of § 1(7A)
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[*10]
We are mindful that in 1991, when the legislature amended the § 1(7A) emotional injury provision from
"significant contiibuting cause" to "predominant contributing cause," it intended a higher and stricter causation standard
apply to purely mental or emotional claims. See Cirignano v. Globe Nickel Plating, 11 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 17,
21 n.2 (1997).
Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge's decision.
So ordered.
Filed: July 8, 2005
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The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to order of the Utah Court of Appeals, issued November 10,2005. The Court of Appeals'
order set aside the Board's previous decision and directed the Board to evaluate Nancy M. Wood's
claim of stress-induced occupational disease according to the standard for legal causation set forth in
Court's order.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED
On February 26, 2001, Mrs. Wood filed an application with the Labor Commission to
compel Eastern Utah Broadcasting and its insurance carrier, Workers Compensation Fund (referred
to jointly as "Eastern" hereafter), to pay occupational disease benefits for Mrs. Wood's "stress and
anxiety" which Mrs. Wood attributed to "stressful situations" arising from her employment at
Eastern.
After an evidentiary hearing, Administrative Law Judge Hann concluded that Mrs. Wood
was entitled to occupational disease benefits for anxiety disorder. Eastern then asked the Appeals
Board to review Judge Hann's decision. On October 18, 2004, the Appeals Board's majority
decision reversed Judge Hann's decision and denied Mrs. Wood's claim. The Board's decision
concluded that Mrs. Wood's work-related stress was not "extraordinary" as that term is defined in §
34A-3-106(2)(b) of the Occupational Disease Act and, therefore, did not satisfy the Act's
requirement of legal causation.
Mrs. Wood appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the
Board's decision with the following conclusion and instruction:
Under Utah Code section 34A-3-106(2)(b), the extraordinary nature of the stress of
[Mrs. Wood's] employment must be judged according to an objective standard in
comparison with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. . . .
rather than with employees in her own profession. Because it is unclear whether the
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stress of [Mrs. Wood's] employment was compared to the stress sustained by those
in her own profession of radio advertising sales or compared to the objective
standard of contemporary national employment and nonemployment life, we vacate
the Appeals Board's order and remand for the Appeals Board to apply the correct
standard in accordance with this opinion.
Pursuant to the Court of Appeals' instructions, the Board has reviewed the
evidentiary record and the arguments of the parties. The Board now enters the following
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Mrs. Wood testified at the evidentiary hearing in this matter. Eastern called no witnesses to
controvert Mrs. Wood's description of the duties and conditions of employment by Eastern. In
addition to Mrs. Wood's unchallenged testimony, the evidentiary record also contains Mrs. Wood's
medical records, opinions of treating and consulting physicians, and the report of the impartial
medical panel appointed by Judge Hann. Based on this evidentiary record the Appeals Board enters
the following findings of fact relative to the issue of legal causation, which is the only issue in
dispute.
Mrs. Wood has an 11th grade education. Her only work experience has been in selling radio
advertising in rural eastern Utah. Almost all of that employment was with Eastern, where she
worked from 1980 until March 16,2000. At the end of her employment at Eastern, Mrs. Wood was
earning approximately $58,000 per year in salary and commissions.
Mrs. Wood's work for Eastern was demanding. She handled all duties associated with her
customers, including sales calls, writing advertising copy, fielding complaints, billing for services
and collecting payment. She was required to contact each customer at least once a week. Over time,
she was assigned additional customers and ultimately was responsible for more than 200 accounts.
In 1997, she was also designated as the company's sales manager, with responsibilities of
supervising and training other sales staff.
Mrs. Wood worked more than 50 hours per week. She frequently began work between 7:00
and 7:30 a.m. and occasionally continued at work until 10:00 p.m. She sometimes worked on
weekends; she also received business calls and did paperwork and research at home during the early
morning and late evening. She carried and monitored two cell phones at the same time for her work.

Eastern experienced a high turnover rate among its advertising sales staff, with some
individuals leaving the work because of stress. Other that Mrs. Wood, none of Eastern's sales staff
stayed for more than a few years. Mrs. Wood's 20-year tenure with Eastern was therefore unusual
and reflected her extreme dedication to her work.
f\f\ « r r o
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Mrs. Wood has a personality type that predisposes her to anxiety and stress. In addition to
the demands of her work, she has experienced some personal health problems and family problems.
For several years prior to leaving her job at Eastern, Mrs. Wood used prescription medications for
depression, anxiety and insomnia. In the period leading up to March 16,2000, Mrs. Wood began to
cry over minor work-related mistakes. Then, while at home on March 16, 2000, she began crying
uncontrollably and could not stop. She has been under continuous medical care for depression,
anxiety, and other medical problems since then. Mrs. Wood is not now capable of returning to
gainful employment.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In claiming occupational disease benefits, Mrs. Wood must, of course, meet all the applicable
requirements of the Utah Occupational Disease Act. Judge Hann's original decision concluded that
Mrs. Wood had satisfied those requirements. Eastern challenged Judge Hann's determination, but
only on one point—whether Mrs. Wood claim of occupational disease benefits for her stress-related
anxiety disorder satisfied the requirement of "legal causation" found in § 34A-2-106 of the Act.
Now, on remand from the Court of Appeals, that is the only issue before the Appeals Board.
The requirement of "legal causation" was first grafted into Utah's workers' compensation
system by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
Nine years later, when the Legislature added § 106 to govern mental stress claims under the Utah
Occupational Disease Act, the Legislature included a "legal causation" requirement in that section as
well. In essence, the requirement of "legal causation" represents a public policy determination of
how far employer liability will extend for the consequences of employment conditions and events.
See Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty, et al, 526 N.W. 2nd 845, 853 (Iowa 1995).
Subsection 106's standards for legal causation in mental stress claims are as follows:
(2)(a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental stress arising
predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is judged according to an
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and
nonemployment life.
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In applying this test for legal causation, it is first necessary to identify the "mental stress
arising predominantly and directly from employment."1 As detailed in the "Findings of Fact,"
above, Mrs. Wood's work required her to work long hours, sometimes from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. She
also worked on weekends, early mornings and late evenings, even when she was at home. In
addition to her long work hours, Mrs. Wood's work duties were extensive. She serviced 200
customer accounts, which entailed weekly calls, copy writing, editing, corrections, billing, and
collection. In essence, Mrs. Wood's work duties were pervasive, overwhelming and unrelenting.
Having identified Mrs. Wood's stress that "arose predominantly and directly" from her
employment, the Appeals Board must determine whether that stress was "extraordinary" within the
meaning of § 106(2). As the Utah Court of Appeals explained in its decision, "the objective
standard referenced in Utah Code section 34A-3- 106(2)(b) requires the Commission to compare the
stress of [Mrs. Wood's] employment with the stress that people nationwide generally endure in their
employment and nonemployment life
" (Emphasis added.) Thus, the proper comparison is not
with either the most stressful or the least stressful situations encountered in life, but rather, the
broader range of conditions that are "generally" experienced.
Mrs. Wood's unchallenged testimony establishes that she was required to continually work
long hours to perform her job duties. The Appeals Board recognizes that many individuals
occasionally work long hours to complete a project or meet a deadline. However, overtime wage
laws and common practice establish the 40-hour week as a general norm. With respect to the
stresses generally endured in nonemployment life, duties such as caring for family members,
keeping house, or lawn care can impose time demands similar to what Mrs. Wood experienced at
work. But in general, the time requirements of home and family do not rise to that level.
Long hours were not Mrs. Wood's only source of work-related stress. She also had the
demands of servicing approximately 200 customers. She had to contact each of them each week.
She was responsible for all phases of their accounts. She wrote their advertising copy. She

1 Analysis of legal causation in a mental stress claim is similar to the analysis used in workers'
compensation claims, where the concept of legal causation first arose.
•
In a workers' compensation claim, it is first necessary to identify the nature and extent of
the workplace exertion on which the claim is based. After the workplace exertion has been
identified, established standards of comparison are usfe'd to judge whether the exertion is
sufficient to constitute legal causation.
•
In stress-related occupational disease claims, it is also necessary to identify the nature
and extent of the workplace stress. Then, the test set out in § 106(2)(b) is applied to
determine whether the stress is "extraordinary" so as to satisfy § 106(l)'s requirement of
legal causation.
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monitored broadcasts. She corrected errors and fielded complaints. She billed them for services and
collected on the accounts. These duties imposed unrelenting pressure on Mrs. Wood.
In comparison, other situations impose equal or greater performance pressures. For example,
some sales positions impose performance demands and require extensive customer service. In
occupations such as medicine or law, practitioners must exercise the utmost care and judgment in
situations that are, literally, life and death. Business executives must sometimes perform their duties
under extreme pressure for high stakes. However, these situations cannot be viewed as examples of
"ordinary" pressures of modem life. When the scope of comparison is limited to the stress that
people generally endure, such as ordinary work loads and occasional "multi-tasking," the Appeals
Board concludes that the demands of Mrs. Wood's work imposed extraordinary stress on her.
In summary, because Mrs. Wood's work-related stress was extraordinary when compared to
the customary stress of modem life, the Appeals Board concludes that Mrs. Wood has satisfied
§106's requirement of legal causation. In light of this conclusion, and in the absence of any other
objections to Judge Hann's decision of July 30,2003, the Appeals Board concurs with Judge Hann's
conclusion that Mrs. Wood is entitled to occupational disease benefits.
ORDER
For the reasons stated herein, the Appeals Board denies Eastern's motion for review dated
August 29, 2003, and affirms the award of benefits to Mrs. Wood contained in Judge Hann's
decision of July 30, 2003. It is so ordered.
Dated this J/

day of March, 2006.

Colleen S. Colton/chair

Patricia S. Drawe

Joseph E. Hatch
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the
court within 30 days of the date of this order.
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Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total Disability and
Order

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615

Telephone: 801-530-6800

NANCY M. WOOD,
Claimant,

*

vs.

*

PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY AND
ORDER

EASTERN UTAH BROADCASTING and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND;
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*

Case No. 2001208

*

Judge Debbie L Hann

Respondents.

The above entitled matter came on for hearing before Debbie L. Hann, and
Administrative Law Judge, Utah Labor Commission on March 6, 2002. The claimant was
present and represented by Bradford Myler, Attorney at Law. The respondents, Eastern Utah
Broadcasting and Workers Compensation Fund were represented by Floyd Holm, Attorney at
Law. The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Sherrie Hayashi, Attorney at Law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These actions were initiated by three applications for hearing filed by the claimant.
Prior to the hearing, case no. 2001209 was resolved via a compromise settlement of claim of
disputed validity approved December 18, 2001. At the hearing, the parties agreed that case
no. 2001210 should be dismissed as it is a duplicate of the claim in 2001209 which has been
resolved. Thus, the only remaining case for adjudication is 2001208.
Case no. 2001208 is an occupational disease claim filed by the claimant on February
26, 2001 alleging the claimant has been unable to work since March 16, 2000 due to stress
and anxiety as the result of exposure to stressful situations in her employment with the
respondent, Eastern Utah Broadcasting. The respondents denied liability for the claim alleging
the claimant does not meet the legal causation requirement of suffering from extraordinary
mental stress arising predominately from her employment and that such stresses be on the
objective standard in comparison with contemporary national employment and nonemployment life. On December 26, 2001, the claimant requested the Employers Reinsurance
Fund be joined in the case and an amended request for answer was issued. The Employers
Reinsurance Fund filed an answer denying liability for the claim and moved to dismiss the
Employers Reinsurance Fund from the action because the claimant first suffered disability on
March 16, 2000 thus, the cause for action did not arise until that day.
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At the hearing, the parties agreed the claimant is disabled and not capable of
maintaining gainful employment.
The only issue raised was whether the claimant's
employment was the cause of her mental condition and if so, what portion, if any, was nonindustrial.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Interim Order was issued on August 20, 2002,
referring the issue of apportionment to a Labor Commission medical panel. The panel issued
its report and it was forwarded to the parties via certified mail on January 2 1 , 2003. No
objections to entry of the medical panel report were received, therefore the medical panel
report is admitted into evidence pursuant to Utah Code § 34A-2-601.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The claimant worked for Eastern Utah Broadcasting, located in Price, Utah, from 1980
through March 16, 2000 as a sales account representative. The claimant was a sales
representative for the company which operates a radio station broadcasting in eastern Utah.
In March 2000, the claimant was earning $3500 per month base salary plus commissions that
at the time she quit were $1000-$1500 per month for a total salary of $4500-$5000 per month.
The claimant's compensation rate for permanent total disability is the weekly maximum of
$433.00.
The claimant is currently unemployed and receives Social Security disability benefits.
The parties agreed the claimant is disabled and not capable of maintaining gainful
employment. The claimant is tentatively permanently and totally disabled beginning March 17,
2000.
Findings Related to Claimant's Symptoms
The claimant began experiencing increasing levels of stress over a period of time that
slowly got worse. The claimant began having anxiety attacks at work because she was scared
that she was not doing the job as she should. The claimant would often come home from work
and go to bed because she felt overwhelmed. The claimant would also wake up at night in a
panic about work. She also had panic attacks, where her heart began racing if she was late to
a sales meeting. She also began crying over small things at work such as not having
advertising copy ready for the DJ to review or a sale appointment that had not gone well. The
claimant usually had panic attacks at work and was able to calm down at home.
In the months following her breakdown in March 2000, the claimant could not leave her
house. She has slowly improved to where she is now able to ride in a car and go into stores
for a brief period.
Prior to March 2000, the claimant was able to control her symptoms with massage
therapy, relaxation tapes and Xanax as needed.
Findings Related to Job Duties and Working Conditions
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The claimant began as a sales representative in 1980 working 50 sales accounts. In
1981, there were 4 sales representatives with 50 accounts each. Throughout the claimant's
employment, sales representatives were hired, trained and the accounts redistributed but they
usually quit in less than a year, so there was constant hiring, training, and redistribution of
work. When a sales representative quit, the accounts were usually re-divided between the
sales representatives, or when the claimant was the only representative left, they were given to
her to handle. By 1986, there were 2-3 representatives covering about 200 accounts with the
number of accounts fluctuating with the number of sales representatives. By 1987, there were
3 representatives working and in 1988, the number went down to 2. By the late 1980s, the
claimant was the only sales representative in charge of 200 accounts. From 1991 through
1993, a second sales representative would be hired and the accounts divided but due to very
high turnover, the claimant was often working by herself. In 1996-97, the claimant was
promoted to sales manager although she was still handling sales accounts. The turnover was
still quite high, with sales representatives usually staying for a year or less, and she was often
the only sales person employed by the respondent. For the first 10 months of 1999, the
claimant was working alone until another representative was hired in October or November
1999. By the time she quit in March 2000, there were only 5 employees to handle 2 radio
stations.
The claimant worked a minimum of 48 hours per week and it was often closer to 50-55
hours per week. The claimant was usually to the office or a remote live broadcast by 7-7:30
Monday through Friday and worked until at least 5:30 p.m. She also worked on account
billings on the weekends and at home in the evenings. She also prepared memos and did
computer research at home in the evenings. The claimant carried 2 cell phones, paid for by
the company, and answered them as early as 5:00 a.m. and as late as 11 p.m.. She
sometimes did not answer them on the weekend but generally made herself available. The
claimant traveled and met with outlying customers in Grand Junction and Emery County at
least once per month. When the claimant became the sales manager in 1997, she went into
the office early to prepare for the sales representatives' arrival and often stayed late to review
what had been done that day and to plan for the next day. The claimant did not have set
hours but worked the number of hours necessary to get the job done which fluctuated with the
time of year and number of other employees.
As a sales representative, the claimant was responsible for selling radio advertising
which required her to sell the time, gather the information necessary to write the ad, draft the
text of the ad for the DJ to read, prepare the billing and collect the money due. To sell the ads,
the claimant met with potential customers and made proposals for advertising. The claimant
also contacted potential customers by telephone and she was required to make phone contact
with each account at least once per week. She also managed the shopping show radio
segment which required her to collects items from merchants for people to listen, call in and
make a bid. In order to make sales, the claimant researched and prepared promotional ideas
to sell to customers. She also provided customer services and follow-up and dealt this upset
or angry customers in the event something went wrong. She also coordinated live broadcasts
each morning from remote business locations and was present during these shows. In 1997,
she was also responsible for training and supervising new sales representatives along with
managing her own accounts. She was also responsible for taking over a representative's
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sales accounts when one quit. By March 2000, the claimant was selling radio ads to the
standing accounts, the coupon by computer sales promotion, the table top news promotion
and the shopping show promotion. The other representative only did the sales accounts and
the coupon by computer promotion.
Tom Anderson, the station owner, was the claimant's supervisor. The claimant
described him as an "intense" person with little patience and a "powerful person." Mr.
Anderson yelled at the claimant on a regular basis, on average about once every 2 months, in
front of others. He complimented her work too. He routinely yelled at the other sales
representatives in her presence. In 1986, the claimant took a medical leave of absence for 3
weeks to a month, in part because of stress, although the release only specified "health
reasons." (Medical exhibit 38). As a result, Mr. Anderson cut the claimant's base salary in half
and would not restore her salary upon her return to work so the claimant quit and eventually
took a job at another station. Several months later, Mr. Anderson re-hired the claimant at her
previous salary. The claimant interpreted this action by Mr. Anderson as a demotion for taking
time off.
The claimant is not a high school graduate. As part of the claimant's training as a sales
representative, the station sent her 1-3 times per year to a high pressure sales seminar she
characterized as "boot camp" from 1981 to 1998 or 1999. This was a 4-5 day training seminar
held in Grand Junction, Colorado where participants were taught the art of the hard sell. The
seminar was always led by the same person who ridiculed the claimant in front of others and
was made an example of what not to do. At these seminars, the claimant was instilled with the
idea that she was personally responsible for all aspects of the advertising process, including
those which she had no direct control such as whether the DJ ran the ad correctly, read the ad
correctly and whether clients paid the bill. The claimant dreaded these seminars and her
medical leave in 1986 was shortly after her return from a seminar.
Radio sales are more difficult than other types of advertising sales because the
merchant has to trust that the ads are running as promised, especially those merchants who
are outside the listening area of the station. The station was also in a small, rural advertising
market and she had to repeatedly approach merchants who had not been interested in radio
advertising. The claimant had to deal with upset or angry customers when something went
wrong such as an error in the advertising. The claimant experienced increased stress, and the
claimant became visibly upset at the hearing when testifying about this, when she took over as
sales manager because she was also responsible for ensuring customers were happy with the
sales representatives' work. The claimant also expressed to Dr. Carlisle that people would get
angry at her for "station-related problems" that were not under her control. Medical exhibit 46.
The claimant had strong feelings of responsibility toward her employment and was
extremely concerned that the community, her co-workers and supervisor did not perceive her
as a failure. She also believed that the success or failure of the station was in large part her
responsiblity since income to the station came through the sales department and she was
often the only person in the sales department. Dr. Carlisle noted in his first session with the
claimant that "[s]he had personalized her work to the point that it was part of her identity." He
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also later notes "...the way she appears to have been managed by guilt and fear in her work..."
Medical exhibit 46.
In May 1999, the claimant was hospitalized with spinal meningitis. Shortly afterward,
the station set up a home office with a computer so that she could do work from home. This
office was in place in her home through March 2000.
On the morning of March 16, 2000, the claimant began crying and could not stop. She
did not know why she was crying. The claimant's husband called the station to report the
claimant would not be coming in to work that day because she was sick. The claimant has not
been able to return to work since.
Findings Related to Claimant's Mental Condition and Treatment
The claimant began taking Xanax for anxiety at least since April 1991. Medical exhibit
35. The claimant did not take the medication on a daily basis and took it only when she was
feeling high levels of anxiety or panic. The claimant testified the panic attacks and extreme
anxiety that lead to taking some Xanax was always related to work. She did not take it daily
but sometimes would take more than 1 pill in a day depending on her anxiety level and severity
of the panic attack. She had more panic attacks and anxiety when she was very busy at work
around holidays, due to the higher number of sales promotions during those times. The
records reflect refills on November 25, 1991, July 23, 1992, December 17, 1993, October 24,
1994 and July 2, 1998. Medical exhibit 31-34. The claimant began taking Prozac in January
2000.
The claimant currently suffers from an anxiety disorder with panic attacks and
depression. As a result, the claimant suffered a nervous breakdown in March 2000. Medical
exhibit 9, 11Aand45.
The claimant has been under Dr. Morgan's care for severe anxiety and depression
since March 2000 which he believes is directly related to and was caused by the claimant's
employment with Eastern Utah Broadcasting. Medical exhibit 11 A. The claimant suffers from
panic attacks which, as of November 14, 2001 prevented her from going out in public. Medical
exhibit 12. Although the claimant has been undergoing treatment since March 2000, Dr.
Morgan's opinion is that the claimant cannot return to work because when she contemplates
such a move, the claimant's anxiety, depression and sleeplessness returns. As a result, Dr.
Morgan does not believe the claimant is able to return to "...any work at the capacity at which
she is skilled and trained for." Medical exhibit 11 A.
The claimant sought therapy for her mental condition from Dr. A.L. Carlisle on a regular
basis from September 2000 through November 2001 through the Division of Rehabilitation
Services. Dr. Carlisle's opinion is that the claimant's condition is related to her work. Dr.
Carlisle found the claimant was a very dedicated worker who gave priority to work over family
and that the stress she felt was caused by her work environment. He noted that other areas of
the claimant's life such as marriage and relationships with her children had been going fairly
well and that the only area of her life causing stress was her employment. Medical exhibit 45.
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This summary is also bourne out by his treatment notes which focus almost exclusively on
work. Dr. Carlisle noted the claimant is gradually improving largely by staying in stress-free
environments such as her home. He also noted she cannot come into therapy without
breaking into tears. He believes the claimant will be unlikely to return to full-time work again
unless it is employment which causes little stress and possibly only on a part time basis.
Medical exhibit 48.
The claimant underwent an independent medical examination by Dr. Mooney. Many of
the questions asked of Dr. Mooney, such as whether the claimant would meet the criteria for a
compensable metal stress claim are outside the scope of Dr. Mooney's expertise as a medical
provider and require a legal conclusion, something reseved for the ALJ. However, with regard
to medical causation, Dr. Mooney's opinion is that the claimant's mental condition is the result
of somatization, chronic back pain, stress intolerance due to meningitis and stress from work.
He notes that work contribution to the claimant's condition is only a percentage of the total
cause of the anxiety disorder although he did not apportion a specific percentage. Dr. Mooney
did not believe the claimant was fit for competitive employment due to her mental health
condition. Medical exhibit 9.
The claimant currently takes Prozac, Xanax, a muscle relaxer, Amitriptyline, Sonata
and Lortab for low back pain.
The claimant suffered extraordinary mental stress. The claimant's employment
contained an extraordinary amount of mental stimulus that would reasonably lead to a person
experiencing mental stress.
The Labor Commission medical panel was comprised of Alvin J. Wirthlin, M.D., a
neurologist, and Robert H. Burgoyne, M.D., a psychiatrist. The only issue referred to the panel
was apportionment of non-industrial causes of the claimant's mental condition. The panel was
supplied with all available medical records and the claimant was examined by the panel
members. Dr. Burgoyne also performed a psychiatric evaluation. The panel agreed wtih Dr.
Mooney that a percentage of the claimant's current mental condition is attributable to nonindustrial factors, including a personality type that predisposes her to stress and anxiety as a
result of multiple stressors.
The panel's opinion was that 50% of the claimant's mental
condition is the result of her work activities with Eastern Utah Broadcasting and 50% from nonindustrial sources. Although Dr. Carlisle is of the opinion all of the claimant's condition may be
attributed to her work at Eastern Utah Broadcasting, it does not appear Dr. Carlisle performed
psychological testing, as Dr. Mooney did, and upon which the panel relied to make a full
assessment of the claimant. Further, Dr. Mooney and the medical panel were also able to
review all of the claimant's medical records, something Dr. Carlisle was not able to do. Thus,
Dr. Mooney and the medical panel opinion is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Dr. Mooney apportioned the claimant's condition between industrial and non-industrial sources,
but he did not break out the percentage, thus, the panel's apportionment of 50% industrial and
50% non-industrial shall be used as the basis for determining benefits.
Findings Related to Claimant's Other Medical Conditions

Ofl'07

Wood v. Eastern Utah Broadcasting
Case No. 2001208, 2001210
Page 7
The claimant suffered from spinal meningitis in 1999 and was hospitalized for 6 days in
May 1999. The claimant had headaches before and after this episode although the
headaches that hospitalized her were the worst she has ever experienced either before or
after this episode. The claimant had strep throat which turned into a spinal infection. Medical
exhibit 143-145.
The claimant had a hysterectomy in 1986 and has been on hormone replacement
therapy, estrogen, since that time.
In 1995, the claimant began having headaches that started with nervous tension. She
sometimes called in sick for several days at a time because she had "collapsed." The claimant
testified she took Ambien in 1997 and Wellbutrin in 1996 or 1997.
On February 17, 1995, the claimant suffered a low back injury at work resulting in a
disc herniation at L4-5. Medical exhibit 85 and 73. The claimant continued to suffer from
ongoing back pain as a result and on March 20, 2000, Dr. Alan Colledge noted the claimant's
back condition was deteriorating. Medical exhibit 51.
Findings Related to Other Possible Causes of Claimant's Mental Condition
The claimant currently married and has been through the time she was employed by
Eastern Utah Broadcasting. Her husband suffered an accident at work in approximately May
1998 and he now receives Social Security Disability benefits. He also recieved some workers
compensation benefits until he reached medical stability. The claimant considered her
marriage to be good and not a source of stress in her life.
The claimant's son is married, and he and his wife and children lived with the claimant
and her husband. Her son divorced, had custody of the children and remarried and had a third
child all while living with the claimant. The claimant's son and family moved out in December
2001. The claimant did take some responsibly for the grandchildren and watched them from
time to time. The claimant and her husband did not support their son and he paid for all
utilities and part of the food expenses. The claimant denied that having her son and his family
live with her was a source of stress for her.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
A compensable occupational disease is "... any disease or illness that arises out of and
in the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated by that employment."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103. Utah recognizes claims for mental conditions caused by
occupational stress in Utah Code § 34A-3-106. That provision states:
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional diseases related to mental
stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall be
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compensable under this chapter only when there is a sufficient
legal and medical causal connection between the employee's
disease and employment.
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary mental
stress arising predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary nature of the alleged mental stress is
judged according to an objective standard in comparison with
contemporary national employment and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, mental,
or emotional disease was medically caused by the mental stress
that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or emotional disease.
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including
disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs,
demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not
form the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair iabor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis of
compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable occupational
disease involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of the
evidence.
A cause of action for an occupational disease is considered to arise on "...the date the
employee first suffered disability from the occupational disease and knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, that the occupational disease was caused by
employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108 (2)(b).
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund has no liability for industrial accidents or
occupational diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. Utah Code § 34A-2-702.
When an occupational exposure is not the sole cause of disability, liability for
occupational disease claims may be apportioned for non-industrial causes. Utah Code § 34A3-110.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The claimant suffered a compensable occupational disease in the course and scope of
her employement at Eastern Utah Broadcasting.
The respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or Workers Compensation Fund, are
liable to the claimant for permanent total disability benefits beginning March 17, 2000 at the
rate of $216.50 per week.
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The respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or Workers Compensation Fund, are
liable to the claimant for 50% of reasonable and necessary medical care related to the
claimant's occupational disease pursuant to the Labor Commission RBRVS schedule.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
/. Compensability of Claimant's Occupational Disease Claim
Utah Code § 34A-3-106 recognizes coverage of mental stress claims based upon
mental stimulus producing a mental or nervous result. The legal causation standard has two
elements: the claimant must suffer "extraordinary mental stress" and "the extraordinary nature
of the stress must be judged in comparison with national employment and non-employement
life."
Stress is defined in Schmidt's Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine as "[a] condition of
strain on one's emotions or a state marked by a series of stimuli of an unpleasant nature which
tend to distort the normal coordinated physilogical and mental process of the body." Thus,
stress is a person's reaction to external stimuli, not the stimuli itself. The occupational disease
statute uses the term "mental stress" both in the context of the stimulus and the result in that it
requires the claimant to suffer from "extraordinary mental stress" arising predominately and
directly from employment but then requires the "extraordinary nature" to be judged by an
objective standard in comparason with national employment. Stress, a person's reaction to
stimuli, is a subjective reaction and cannot be judged on a national employment standard.
However, the stimuli causing the stress can be so assessed and thus the ALJ concludes that
the statute intends the objective analysis of the legal causation standard to be of the stimuli,
not of the stress reaction to stimuli. Thus, the ALJ concludes the claimant must prove, in
addition to suffering from extraordinary mental stress, that the stimili she experienced was
more than the usual stress of everyday work and non-work life generally in the late 20th
century. This is solely a legal standard and is not a medical determination as the statute sets
forth that medical causation requires medical evidence, that the mental stress reaction was
medically caused by the stimuli of the work environment.
The first element of the legal causation standard, that the claimant suffered from
extraordinary mental stress is easily demonstrated by the medical records. The claimant
suffered a nervous breakdown, suffers from an anxiety disorder marked by severe panic
attacks and depression. This condition was the result of mental stimuli experienced by the
claimant and must be controlled by medication. The claimant, as a result, cannot easily leave
her home, has difficulty riding in a car and has difficulty handling social interaction with anyone
but family members. Such a reaction is clearly extraordinary in that the average person does
not, in the normal course of work, have such a reaction to mental stimuli of working and living
in late 20th century American society.
The second element of the legal causation standard, that the stimuli she experienced
was more than the usual stress of everyday work and non-work life in the late 20th century is
more difficult. While it is clear the statute recognizes people can suffer from mental disease
resulting from mental stimuli in the workplace, it is also clear the statute intends that to be
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compensable, the workplace stimuli must be more than an average workplace. Yet, to say that
all workplaces are stress inducing would bar any claim and that is clearly not the intent.
Therefore, the evidence of the workplace environment must demonstrate a situation of
more than the day to day emotional strain and tension that all employees experience as a
consequence of engaging in the demands of employment and daily interactions with people
outside one's immediate family and friends. The workplace stimuli must also be assessed
objectively to determine whether they were capable of producing mental stress in individuals
generally. The ALJ disagrees with the respondents that the stimuli must be compared with
other employment of the same type the claimant was engaged. The statute references
"contemporary national employment...life" a broader comparison standard than just to other
employees in the same type of employment. Had the legislature intended a narrower
comparison, the language of the statute would have so expressed such a standard. The clear
meaning of the statute is an average, aggregate of employment experience that an average
American worker experiences in daily work life.
Significant changes have occured in the late 20th century American work environment
due to technology and downsizing. It is generally expected that in today's workforce fewer
employees will handle more tasks with the aid of technology. Technological changes have
now blurred the once distinct line between work and private life. Computers, the internet and
remote work network access make it possible for many employees to work from home. Cell
phones, pagers and e-mail also allow communication outside the confines of the office.
Despite these changes however, an employer cannot consider an employee to be
available to work at all hours of the day and night and on weekends, whether the employee is
salaried or not. Off duty efforts are not generally inherent in work situations and most jobs do
not require extensive night and weekend preparation on a regular basis to perform the work
competently. While cell phone make it possible to contact an employee when they are working
outside the office setting, some parameters of when an employee is expected to answer and
be available is necessary. An employee cannot be expected to respond during all off hours as
the effect would be to never truly be off the job. It is still generally accepted that an average
work day in the United States is 8 hours and that an average work week is 40 hours.
While employers may experience periods of high employee turnover resulting in other
employees accepting extra duties on a temporary basis, a constant increase in workload over
long periods of time is not common to most employment. All employment has busy times but a
prolonged increase in hours combined with additional job duties is beyond the average
employment.
In this case, there are numerous conditions, when taken in combination, exceed the
average employment experience in contemporary American life that would result in an average
person experiencing an extraordinary level of mental stress.
During the 20 years of employment, there was significant employee turnover which
required the claimant to routinely pick up other employees' work loads and for some extended
periods of time, the claimant was solely reponsible for all sales. Because the claimant was a
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senior employee, when new people were hired, she had to spend extra time helping new
employees learn the job and this became her official job duty in 1997.
The claimant
experienced consistent extra workload and duties, from employee training and picking up work
left by employees quitting, rather than intermittant increases.
The claimant was routinely required to work more than a 40 hour work week, usually
50-55 hours per week. When the claimant became ill in 1986 and took time off (3-4 weeks)
she was demoted and had her salary cut in half thus sending a clear message that she was
not to take time away from work, even for medical reasons. When she became ill and was
hospitalized in 1999, EUB installed a computer in her home so that she could continue
working. She also responded to early morning, late night and weekend phone calls from 2 cell
phones provided by her employer. It is not common in an employment setting to be required to
respond to 2 cell phones. There was little time when the claimant could be away from her work
responsiblities.
The claimant had more than average job duties for a sales representative. She was
also responsible for preparing the account billing and ensuring accounts were paid, in addition
to selling the advertising. When she was made a supervisor, she was still in charge of
significant sales responsiblities in addition to supervising and training new account
representatives. The promotion added significant job duties to an already full work schedule
rather than allowing her to delegate servicing accounts to solely concentrate on managerial
duties of training, supervision, customer relations and development of advertising promotions.
The claimant's supervisor had a somewhat volitile personality and had no hesitation in
publicly reprimanding both the claimant and other employees. Although the claimant was
reprimanded on average of every other month, having to see and hear fellow employees be
reprimanded caused stress inducing stimili and this was not an uncommon occurance.
Further, public reprimands in front of less senior account representatives or customers would
reasonably cause an average person to experience mental stress. In addition to the public
reprimands she experienced from her employer, the claimant was also sent by EUB to high
pressure sales seminars, she characterized as "boot camp", where she was humiliated in front
of others on a regular basis. These seminars took place out of state for several days at a time
resulting in regular long expsoure to conditions resulting in a stress reaction.
The claimant also was in a position for taking responsiblity for things over which she
had little or no control. When customers got angry at her for mistakes in the way ad copy was
read or when a customer did not pay a bill, the claimant was held responsible but these were
events outside her control to correct or change. The claimant, as often the only sales
representative was responsible in many ways for the continued existence of the station as
much of the revenue to run the company depended on her abilities to sell ads and collect
revenue.
Thus, taking all of the aspects of the claimant's employment into consideration in
comparison with the day to day stress an average employee experiences in work life, the
claimant's employment contained an extraordinary amount of mental stimulus that would
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reasonably lead to a person experiencing mental stress. Therefore, the claimant has met her
burden of proving her employment was the legal cause of her mental condition.
The claimant also has the burden of proving the mental stress that resulted from stimiii
at her employment is the medical cause of her current condition. There is no dispute that at
least a portion of the claimant's medical condition was caused by her employment. There was
a dispute as to apportionment of non-industrial causes. Drs. Morgan and Carlisle believe the
claimant's employment at EUB is the sole cause of her condition and that no apportionment to
non-industrial causes is warranted. Dr. Mooney believes only a portion of her condition is the
result of her employment. Therefore, the issue of apportionment was referred to a medical
panel for evaluation. The panel agreed that non-industrial factors contributed to the claimant's
condition and apportioned 50% to non-industrial causes. As stated above, the preponderance
of evidence supports apportionment and as the panel is the only opinion as to an exact
amount, the benefits will be reduced accordingly.
//. Employers' Reinsurance Fund Motion to Dismiss
The Employers Reinsurance Fund only has liability for those injuries or occupational
diseases occuring before July 1, 1994. Although the claimant's exposure occurred before this
date, her claim did not arise under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108 (2)(b) until March 16, 2000
when she was no longer able to work due to occupational disease. Therefore, the Employers
Reinsurance Fund has no liability for this claim and is dismissed as a party.
ORDER
IT IS HEREWITH ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or
Workers Compensation Fund pay the claimant $38,010.91 for permanent total disability
compensation covering the period March 17, 2000 through July 29, 2003. This amount is
accrued and due and payable to the claimant plus interest at the rate of 8% per annum
purusant to 612-1-5, U.A.C., less $6,726.64 in attorneys fees payable directly to Bradford
Myler, Attorney at Law plus 15% of accrued interest.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or
Workers Compensation Fund, pay the claimant ongoing weekly permanent total disability
compensation beginning July 30, 2003 at the rate of $216.50 per week until further order of
the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or
Workers Compensation Fund, pay 50% of reasonable and necessary medical care related to
the claimant's occupational disease.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents, Eastern Utah Broadcasting and/or
Workers Compensation Fund,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is dismissed as a
party.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that case number 2001210 is dismissed.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION

Ml
DEBBIE L HANN
Administrative Law Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review,
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.
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Salt Lake City, tLT 84103

Tel. (801) 408-2555
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Honorable Debbie L. Hann
Administrative Law Judge
Labor Commission of Utah
160 E. 300 So./P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Date of Panel: November 12, 2002
Re: Nancy Wood
Emp. Eastern Utah Broadcasting
Inj. Occupational Disease
LC# 2001208
MEDICAL PANEL REPORT
A medical panel consisting of Drs. Robert H. Burgoyne, MD., and Alvin J. Wirthlin, M.D., with
the latter as chairman, met to evaluate the case of Nancy Wood with reference to an occupational
disease.
The file made available to the panel was reviewed by the panel members. The history was
reviewed with the applicant, and she was examined by the panel members. X-rays were reviewed
as well.
The records which were reviewed consist of the following:
Records from George Mooney, Ph.D.
Records from Max G. Morgan, MD.
Records from A.L. Carlisle, PhD.
Records from Alan L. Colledge, M.D.
Records from Jeannee Olsen, P. A.
Records from Blain Jensen, P.A.
Records from Dr. Paylen
Records from Glenn L. Momberger, M.D.
Records from Glenn Etzel, MD.
Records from Fred W. Feverstein, M.D.
Physical therapy notes
A variety of diagnostic studies
Records from Castleview Hospital
Records from St. Mary's Hospital
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INJURY AND TREATMENT HISTORY
This case involves an occupational disease claim alleging an inability to work since March 16,
2000 due to stress, anxiety, and depression. It is alleged that this is the result of exposure to
stressful conditions in her employment. The statement of the case, Findings of Fact provide
extensive detail about the work conditions which will not be reproduced here. On page 10, the
conclusion is reached
"Thus, taking all of the aspects of the claimant's employment into consideration in
comparison with the day-to-day stress an average employee experiences in work
life, the claimant's employment contained an extraordinary amount of mental
stimulus that would reasonably lead to a person experiencing mental stress.
Therefore, the claimant has met her burden of proving her employment was the
legal cause of her mental condition."
It is further noted that there is no dispute that at least a portion of the petitioner's medical
condition was caused by her employment but the dispute revolves around a difference of opinion
of apportionment.
The panel review with the petitioner was carried out under somewhat difficult circumstances. It
was very difficult to put the petitioner at ease. Throughout the interview, lasting an hour and a
half, she exhibited repetitive bouncing of one leg up and down and repetitive movements of one
hand or the other. She was tearful continuously throughout the interview for the first hour, finally
able to control her emotions for the last half an hour.
The petitioner supplied a description of her work situation which parallels that in the Findings of
Fact. Basically in her work over a period of 20 years of selling ads, writing copy, and collecting
money, she felt full responsibility for things going wrong and by her account basically had no
other life except for her work. This included evenings, weekends, and long hours at work. She
described losing employees and having the remainder of the workload placed on her. She also
describes quitting work at that radio station on one occasion when her salary was cut in half after
taking a leave of absence. A few months later she returned to the same job with the original
salary, but by her account she was not able to handle the increased stress.
The petitioner was seen by her family practitioner, Dr. Max Morgan, since 1972. The records do
not include any mention of mental illness or stress/anxiety disorder. On June 10, 1999 she was
seen with multiple symptoms including headache and insomnia. Again, however, there is no
mention of anxiety or stress. There was a question of a viral encephalitis on that date. On August
5, 1999, she complained of decreased memory, extreme fatigue, and inability to function with
experiencing fatigue. Starting with a note dated April 13, 2000 she complained of headaches and
the note indicates she had been placed on Prozac by Dr. Monahan. This was for depression. He
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also comments that at the time she was easily brought to tears. On the 24th of April 2000 Dr.
Morgan gave her a medical leave of absence due to health reasons of two to four weeks. Also, on
the 4th of May 2000 she had concerns regarding anxiety and stress for which she had counseling.
On the 15th of May the note included reference to headaches, sleep disturbance, episodes of crying
spells, panic disorder, and becoming extremely anxious. It is noted that "She is easily brought to
tears upon questioning her. She admits to having fear of being in public, fear of driving, fear of
the job, suddenly awakening in the middle of the night, hyperventilating, becoming exquisitely
short of breath, rapid heart rate, tachycardia." On that date Dr. Morgan supplied a medical
restriction from work for at least three to four months. Subsequent notes continue to refer to
anxiety and depression, fears, and she was to be evaluated by Karl Kraync for psychological
counseling.
On the 24th of October 2000 Dr. Morgan supplied a letter "To Whom It May Concern." "Mrs.
Wood is presently disabled from her own or any occupation due to the following reasons: major
anxiety, depression, status post fracture left foot, status post viral encephalitis with residual
emotional lability, menopausal syndrome."
On November 14, 2001, Dr. Morgan indicates in a letter "To Whom It May Concern" that "Ms.
Wood is still disabled from any occupation because of her anxiety disorder and panic attacks.
This position is in agreement with Karl Kraync of the Division of Rehabilitation that Ms. Wood's
current emotional circumstance is directly related to her stress from her working environment." A
further letter dated March 5, 2002 also states "We feel that the stress and anxiety that she has
suffered has been directly related to and caused by her employment and under such circumstances
she was advised to undergo a medical leave of absence." By that date she was still unable to
return to work.
Therapy review notes were supplied by A.L. Carlisle, Ph.D. beginning on September 27, 2000.
Apparently Karl Kraync is her Department of Rehabiliation Services counselor. In his initial note,
Dr. Carlisle indicates the petitioner worked at the radio station for 20 years and developed viral
encephalitis and Epstein Barr. He reports her as having panic attacks and posttraumatic stress
disorder. He indicates she was on Prozac and Xanax and cried during most of that session.
Subsequent therapy review notes indicate crying easily, particularly during sessions, and
struggling with stress and depression. Panic attacks apparently continued. In a note dated
November 2, 2001, Dr. Carlisle comments "She was married to her job as much if not more than
to her husband. She takes great pride in doing well on a job. She talks about training sessions
she was sent to in which the participants were led to believe that if they do not keep their
production up at a high level they are failures. I feel that her breakdown came from accumulated
stress over a period of several years." He felt that she would not ever be able to return to work
full time unless with a relatively stress-free job.
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The petitioner was evaluated by George Mooney, Ph.D. on January 7, 2002. This represented an
independent psychological evaluation. When relating the petitioner's history, Dr. Mooney
comments, "According to Ms. Wood she has had mental health problems for the past two years
only and otherwise has not had any mental health conditions or mental health treatment. The
records actually reflect that she was treated for anxiety on a prolonged basis after her
hysterectomy. Progress notesfromher family doctor indicated that she was regularly taking
Xanax beginning at least in late 1991." However, he noted there did not otherwise seem to be a
past history of mental health conditions or mental health treatment. An MMPI-II, Beck
depression inventory and symptom checklist were tests that were administered. He felt the MMPI
revealed significant elevations of scales III, I, and II, conforming to the "Conversion V" profile.
Dr. Mooney comments, "Overall these clinical elevations suggest that Ms. Wood may be a person
who converts psychological problems into physical complaints, such as headaches. These
defenses may be somewhat tenuousfroma psychological point of view, because they are
obviously not protecting herfromanxiety." The Beck depression inventory gave her a score of
40 which would ordinarily be found in severely depressed individuals. Dr. Mooney5s diagnosis
was "Axis I: generalized anxiety disorder. Major depressive disorder single episode in partial
remission. Axis III: back pain, hysterectomy, encephalitis." He concluded that she did not appear
fit for competitive work or school activities on the basis of her mental health condition. In answer
to a direct question to consider what portion of her stress is related to her work exposure, Dr.
Mooney answered, "Ms. Wood's anxiety appears to be multi-factorial in nature and related to
preexisting anxiety disorder, personality characteristics such as somatization, chronic back pain,
stress intolerance due to meningitis and routine stressesfromwork. Of these factors, the routine
stresses from work are probably only a perecentage of the total cause of her generalized anxiety
disorder."
In his summary and impressions, Dr. Mooney concludes:
"The patient apparently has had personality characteristics of the preexisting
nature, which resulted in denial of emotional distress on her part and a possible
conversion of unacceptable psychological distress into physical symptoms such as
headaches. She also appeared to have a strong need to please other people. In
particular, she has had somewhat of a paternalistic relationship with her employer.
The combination of these two factors, including her need to please others and a
paternalistic relationship with her employer, may have made it difficult for her to
criticize her work hours or work conditions."
CURRENT SYMPTOMS
The petitioner indicates that she becomes stressed very easily and is very often tearful. She
indicates that she will cry easily but never used to do this. Anytime she talks about her current
situation or past work experience she will always cry, but otherwise not necessarily under other
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circumstances. When she quit her work she did so because she could not stop crying. She
reports that gradually this has lessened so that now she is able to go to town and interact with
people where she could not do so before. She reports that she will sleep eight hours a night as
long as she takes Ambien. She reports that she has some forgetfulness and she is not as organized
as she used to be. She denies suicidal thoughts or past attempts. She denies hallucinations,
although in her mind she seemed to hear radio station broadcasts for about a year and a half after
she left work. She denies feeling picked on or paranoid ideation. When she is not under stress
she believes she does reasonably well. She reports some back pain from time-to-time. She
indicates that she had no anxiety or depression either in her growing up or young adult years.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY, SOCIAL HISTORY, AND FAMILY HISTORY
The petitioner had a hysterectomy in 1986. There is a history of a left foot fracture. She was
hospitalized for her hysterectomy, strep throat, and what was called viral meningitis or
encephalitis in 1999. She had headaches with normal spinal fluid. She also has been treated for
hypertension. She has hay fever. Current medications include Prinzide; Valium, she thinks 5 mg
two at night and two in the morning; amitriptyline, unknown strength; Parafon Forte, a muscle
relaxant; Prozac; and Ambien.
A review of the petitioner's medical record reveals the following. Glenn Etzel, M.D., saw her on
August 14, 1989 for vague complaints of fatigue. His appraisal was "Fatigue. Suspect this is
functional." The notes include symptoms such as diffuse myalgias, headache, and the 1995 back
injury on February 17, 1995 with an impression of lumbar radiculopathy. Subsequent notes
indicate such things as complaints of losing control of the right leg and continuing back problems
with some numbness, dry cough, body aches, diarrhea, swollen glands.
Of considerable interest is a letter dictated by Glenn L. Momberger, M.D., dated April 6, 1995 to
the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah indicating the petitioner had a classic radiculopathy and
needed a lumbar MRI scan. The final paragraph of his letter states, "She is so happy with her job,
that she thinks she can modify it, as she moves around town, and live with her current situation."
On October 10, 1996 in a note Dr. Momberger documents that she had been followed for nearly
two years with a disc herniation at L4-5 and was not getting better by her account. Because of
continuing pain she was referred to Dr. Alan Colledge. He saw her on the 22nd of January 1997
and commented on her continued back and right leg pain. In a note dated May 2, 1997, Dr.
Colledge comments, "She can no longer live with this pain and wishes to have it addressed in
some form or fashion including consideration of surgery."
Dr. Colledge saw her again in March of 2000 with continued low back pain which, by his account,
over time became progressively worse. "She is in pain 100% of the time in her right leg mostly.
At its worst her pain is 10/10, averaging 5/10."
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EXAMINATION
A mental status examination was conducted by Dr. Burgoyne and will be reported separately in
his letter.
X-RAY REVIEW
No x-rays were forwarded for review.
CONCLUSIONS
Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, and
acknowledgmg the stipulation of facts, the panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical
probability as follows:
1.

What portion of the petitioner's current mental condition was medically caused by her
industrial exposure and what portion, if any, is the result of non-industrial causes?
Answer: The panel members agree with George Mooney, Ph.D., that a percentage
of her current mental condition is attributable to her occupational exposure. There
were stresses other than her job situation including chronic low back pain which
Dr. Alan Colledge had characterized as severe and worsening. Her MMPI
suggests the presence of a personality type which may predispose her to stress and
anxiety as a result of multiple stressors. She also suffered chronic headaches
which were an additional stress. Taking this into consideration, the panel members
agree that 50% of her current mental condition is attributable to the occupational
exposure.
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Respectfully submitted,

^

^

Alvin J. \#irthlin, M.D
Neurologist
Panel Chairman

KoDert H. Burgoyr
Psychiatrist
Panel Member
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